Will grant of certiorari in Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC affect other cases? Not so far.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2009) will be reviewed by the Supreme Court in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, --- S.Ct. ----, 2010 WL 303962, 78 USLW 3454, 78 USLW 3677, 78 USLW 3687 (U.S. May 24, 2010) (NO. 09-893).  The issue presented in Concepcion has been framed by some as calling for a determination of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts the State of California from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration.  Others have more aggressively described the issue more broadly.  In either event, the question of concern to litigants now is the effect, if any, of that decision to grant review in other cases.  In at least one case, there was no evident effect.

United States District Court Judge Jeremy Fogel (Northern District of California) denied a motion to stay that was predicated upon the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Concepcion.  Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 2010 WL 2348642 (June 8, 2010) (unpublished).

AT&T's preemption argument based on Stolt-Nielsen is dead before it hits the floor

United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken (Northern District of California) has already been gifted with the privilege of considering whether Stolt-Nielsen S. A. et al. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. (discussed on this blog here) preempts any state law that would preclude enforcement of an arbitration agreement.  McArdle v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 2010 WL 1532334 (N.D.Cal. May 10, 2010).  Judge Wilken took care of that argument in one sharp paragraph:

Defendants assert that Stolt-Nielsen creates a substantial question as to whether the “FAA would preempt any holding that California law precludes enforcement of McArdle's agreement to arbitrate his disputes with” them on an individual basis. Mot. for Leave at 4. The Court disagrees. The issue presented in Stolt-Nielsen was “whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).” 2010 WL 1655826, at *4. The Supreme Court did not address FAA preemption. Nor did it overrule its precedent upon which the Ninth Circuit relied in Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., which held that California law on unconscionability could render an arbitration clause unenforceable, 498 F.3d 976, 986-87 (9th Cir.2007).  Stolt-Nielsen is distinguishable both on the facts and the law and, therefore, does not require this Court to reconsider its order on Defendants' motion to stay this action pending their appeal.

Slip op., at 1.  One interesting bit of information is also included in the Order.  The Ninth Circuit recently held that Shroyer continues to control the issue of unconscionability analysis under California law.  Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2009). AT&T filed a petition for certiorari in Laster, upon which they expect the Supreme Court to rule by May 24.  If the Supreme Court takes up Laster, they will be forced to explicitly address carve-outs alluded to by the dissent in Stolt-Nielsen but not addressed by the majority opinion.

From Bridgeport's 6th Annual Wage & Hour Litigation Conference: Future attacks on Gentry v. Superior Court

I'm attending Bridgeport's 6th Annual Wage & Hour Litigation Conference. Today, one topic of discussion is the subject of class arbitrations after Gentry. According to Steven Katz, partner at Reed Smith LLP, Gentry is one of the California Supreme Court's most erroneously-reasoned decisions in quite some time. That's not the interesting part (it's the funny part). The interesting commentary comes from how the defense bar hopes to limit Gentry.

Mr. Katz starts from the premise that Gentry. does not state a bright-line rule precluding class action waivers in all wage & hour class actions. The defense bar hopes to elicit further review of Gentry by challenging trial and appellate orders that impose a bright-line rule when invalidating arbitration agreements with such waivers. The protective measure that plaintiffs should take is to draft proposed orders that identify the four-factor test from Gentry as having been satisfied.

The second major challenge to Gentry that is being tested at the appellate level is a species of "field" preemption. The defense contention is that Gentry allows for a type of contract impairment that isn't directed at arbitration agreements directly, but nevertheless affects only those types of agreements. This argument disregards the fact that the principles in Gentry are subject-neutral. It is merely the nature of the effect of these agreements that renders them invalid. The factors in Gentry don't seek out just arbitration agreements with class action waivers. Despite that weakness in the defense-side argument, plaintiffs should handle these arguments with great care. This species of "field" premption is very complex, and the attorneys bringing these arguments often have an advantage in the form of repeated experience with them. Don't take a novel preemption argument lightly.

Back to the drawing board: AT&T's arbitration agreement that bans class actions is still unconscionable

It seems to me that the telecommunications and credit card industries are more determined to make an arbitration agreement with a class action ban stick than any other industry.  Most employers have given up that dream, but not the phone company and not the bank.  The latest arbitration agreement with a class action ban comes to us compliments of AT&T Mobility LLC.  But, in Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC (October 27, 2009), the Ninth Circuit sends another class action ban to the unconscionability graveyard, and just in time for Halloween.

Those crazy mad scientists in the secret AT&T Arbitration Agreement Drafting Lab (also known as the "Triple A - DL" to those in the know), their latest scheme to ban class actions was ingenious, and could have helped them take over the world!  The plan was to circumvent the holding of Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007) with a little bonus payment clause:

[T]he phone company points to a new wrinkle: unlike the arbitration clause in Shroyer, this arbitration clause provides for a “premium” payment of $7,500 (the jurisdictional limit of California’s small claims court) if the arbitrator awards the customer an amount greater than the phone company’s last written settlement offer made before selection of an arbitrator. Hence, says the phone company, the arbitration clause is not an artifice that has the practical effect of rendering it immune from individual claims.

Slip op., at 14391.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and shot down a preemption argument along the way:

We will find, on second blush, the new “premium” payment does not distinguish this case from Shroyer, and that under California law, the present arbitration clause is unconscionable and unenforcable [sic]. Further, we will also find no merit to the phone company’s claim the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California unconscionability law.

Slip op., at 14391.  Back to the Triple A - DL, Snidely.  For those not satisfied with just the holding, the Court's analysis relied heavily on Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005):

The California Supreme Court addressed the unconscionability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements for the first time in Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), holding that class action waivers were at least sometimes unconscionable under California law. 113 P.3d at 1108. Class actions, the court reasoned, serve the important policy function of deterring and redressing wrongdoing, particularly where a company defrauds large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money. Id. at 1105. Class action waivers pose a problem because, “small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Id. at 1106. In this way, the class action waiver allows the company to insulate itself from liability for its wrongdoing and the policy behind class actions is thwarted. Id. at 1109.

Slip op., at 14394.  The Court then explained how it interpreted the test in Discover Bank:

We have interpreted Discover Bank as creating a three-part test to determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is unconscionable: (1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are disputes between the contracting parties likely to involve small amounts of damages; and (3) is it alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money. Id. at 983. In Shroyer, we noted that “there are most certainly circumstances in which a class action waiver is unconscionable under California law despite the fact that all three parts of the Discover Bank test are not satisfied.” Id. Because we hold that the class action waiver at issue satisfies all three parts of the test, as was true in Shroyer, “it is unnecessary to explore those circumstances here.” Id.

Slip op., at 14395.  The application of the Discover Bank test tracks Shroyer.  The Court then disposed of AT&T's contention that the promise of a premium payment distinguished this agreement from Shroyer:

The $7,500 premium payment is available only if AT&T does not make a settlement offer to the aggrieved customer in a sum equal to or higher than is ultimately awarded in arbitration, and before an arbitrator is selected. This means that if a customer files for arbitration against AT&T, predictably, AT&T will simply pay the face value of the claim before the selection of an arbitrator to avoid potentially paying $7,500. Thus, the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22. We held in Shroyer that a claim worth a few hundred dollars did not provide adequate incentive for a customer to bother pursuing individual arbitration. 498 F.3d at 986. The $30.22 at issue here is even less of an incentive to file a claim. As a result, aggrieved customers will predictably not file claims—even if the odds are that after the letter-writing and arbitrator-choosing, they will get a $30.22 offer—thereby “greatly reduc[ing] the aggregate liability” AT&T faces for allegedly mulcting small sums of money from many consumers. See id. The premium payment provision has no effect on this conclusion, nor do any of the other provisions of AT&T’s revised arbitration clause. The actual damages a customer will recover remain predictably small, thus under the rationale of Discover Bank and Shroyer, AT&T’s class action waiver is in effect an exculpatory clause, hence substantively unconscionable.

Slip op., at 14397-98.  I'll spare you any excerpts from the preemption discussion.  It's sufficient to say that the Court was impressed with a repeat of arguments rejected in Shroyer.

Today's lessons from the Court of Appeal: things not to do

Complex litigation and civil procedure frequently intersect, probably because everyone is scrutinizing every crossed T and dotted I in high stakes litigation.  Today, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Six) offers not one, but two procedural lessons that are at least as likely to arise in complex litigation matters as they are in the simplest of civil actions.

Our first of two lessons comes from Alvis v. County of Ventura (October 20, 2009).  If you have an expert, and he writes a report, and you try to oppose summary judgement with an expert declaration that contradicts his own prior report on a material point, make sure he explains why he changed his tune:

Most significantly, Singh's declaration asserts that the slide started at the bottom of the cliff when the wall failed. This directly contradicts his prior statement in a report to an insurance company that "[f]ailure started as a landslide in the upper reaches and then flowed at a rapid rate down to the developed area below." This is not a minor point. Singh's statement that the slide started in the upper reaches of the cliff directly undercuts the premise on which his entire declaration is based. Yet, Singh offers no explanation.

Slip op., at 15.  If the expert had provided a credible explanation for why he altered his opinion, it might have made it past the summary judgment stage.

The next lesson is as much for arbitrators as it is for parties to litigation.  Burlage v. Superior Court (Spencer) (October 20, 2009) observes that "[i]t is not often that a trial court vacates an arbitration award and an appellate court affirms the order."  Slip op., at 1.  Since Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 3 Cal. 4th 1 (1992), lower courts have struggled to define the limited circumstances when a trial court can properly review an arbitration award.  Burlage concludes that one such circumstance arises when the arbitrator excludes material evidence, denying one contracting party the benefit of the arbitration bargain:  "The parties to an arbitration have bargained for a final and binding decision.  (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 10.) But without the opportunity to present material evidence, Spencer did not receive the benefit of that bargain."  Slip op., at 7.  Notably, there is a dissent, which argues, in substance, that the exclusion of evidence followed a ruling of law that the evidence was inadmissible, and the accuracy of that ruling cannot be reviewed by the trial court.

Credit goes to Presiding Justice Gilbert for both opinions.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of August 17, 2009

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference today. Notable results include:

• A transfer Order issued in Pfizer, Inc. v. Superior Court (Galfano) following the decision in the lead case, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009).  See also, additional comments in this post at The UCL Practitioner.
• A transfer Order issued in McAdams v. Monier following the decision in the lead case, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009).
• A Petition for Review was denied in Olvera v. El Pollo Loco (arbitration agreement found unconscionable; no lucky for clucky).

New class action blog reports on a potentially major story about arbitration abuse

I'd like to welcome a new class action blog, The Oregon Class Action Blog, to the blogosphere.  The emphasis looks to be on class action developments in Oregon, but there are newsworthy posts about class action developments in other states as well.

Today's post, entitled Bombshell: State of Minnesota sues National Arbitration Forum, reports on Minnesota's recently filed lawsuit against National Arbitration Forum, a major arbitration provider.  The suit claims that NAF is a front for debt collectors and their law firms and not an independent arbitration service.  The story includes a link to the complaint (long, but worth reading, especially if you have ever harbored suspicions about NAF).

I've added a sidebar link to the Oregon Class Action Blog.  If class action and consumer law interests you, visit this new blog and offer some words of encouragement.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of June 15, 2009

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference today.  Notable results include:

• A Petition for Review was denied in Etheridge v. Reins International California, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 908 (2009) (tip pooling)
• A Petition for Review was denied in Budrow v. Dave & Buster's of California, 171 Cal. App. 4th 875 (2009) (tip pooling)
• A Petition for Review was denied in Franco v. Athens Disposal Company, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1277 (2009) (class action waiver and PAGA waiver in arbitration agreement)
• The Court also issued an opinion modification but denied rehearing in Strauss v. Horton (2009)

This was a rare week where the California Supreme Court denied review or other relief in every matter considered in Conference.