Nationwide class action against American Express goes to trial; Amex prevails

In the grand scheme of civil litigation, there aren't that many class actions as a percentage of lawsuits filed (probably around one half of one percent of unlimited civil filings in California, for example; see post).  Rarer still are the nationwide class actions.  And rarest of all, the nationwide class action that goes to trial.  Believed by some to be extinct, a recent sighting in the wild confirms that it still exists, at least in theory.

On March 26, after 11 weeks of testimony from the class, Judge George Hernandez of the California Superior Court in Fremont, California, in a nonjury trial, ruled that plaintiffs failed to prove their case.  (Pamela A. MacLean, Amex Wins Rare National Class Action Trial Over Allegations of Overcharging (March 31, 2009) www.law.com and www.nlj.com.)  The suit alleged that Amex charged a fee for airline travel purchased on its charge card and would sweep in inappropriate insurance charges for flights consumers later canceled, seat upgrades and baggage fees.

Not surprisingly, plaintiffs' counsel indicated that an appeal is on the way.

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"Tip Pooling" class actions are the latest craze

Greatsealcal100Today, in Etheridge v. Reins International California, Inc., the California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) issued an opinion in a class action lawsuit about the practice of "tip pooling" common in restaurants and casinos.  That, by itself, might not even be interesting enough to write about here.  But it is news when it marks the third such opinion on the topic this yearLu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 466 began the trend, followed by Grodensky v. Artichoke Joe’s Casino (March 11, 2009) ___ Cal.App.4th ___.  Grodensky was exciting in that it created a split of authority as to whether Labor Code section 351 provides for a private right of action or serves merely as a predicate violation of law under the UCL.

This effectively sums up the dearth of good class action-related news in California this week.

UPDATE (3/30/09):  A reader has been kind enough to let me know that I missed the fourth such case this year, Budrow v. Dave & Buster's of California, Inc. (March 2, 2009) (Second Appellate District, Division Eight).  That same reader advised me that Petitions for Review have been or will be filed in several of these cases.

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Post frequency and miscellany

Last week was pretty hectic, and this one isn't shaping up to be any better for different reasons, but The Complex Litigator will work to get back on track with more frequent posts as soon as possible.  For very short news links, the sidebar Twitter feed is a sort of micro-blogging adjunct to this site.

On an unrelated note, I've noticed a massive increase in trackback spam, most of it related to various pharmaceuticals.  The spam filters on Typepad have done a great job at catching that junk, but if something slips through, I apologize and don't follow those links.

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In Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., another pre-emption argument falls flat

Greatsealcal100With collateral attacks on the class action device – such as several efforts to amend California’s class action law (Code Civ. Proc., § 382) – proving unsuccessful, the name of the game in recent years has been pre-emption arguments. In general, it’s fair to say that those arguments have had limited success. <cough> Wyeth. <cough> In Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (March 24, 2009), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) considered whether the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act of 1965 (SCA) (41 U.S.C. § 351 et seq.) pre-empts all state law remedies for wage & hour violations.

The Court described the SCA:

The SCA requires government contractors to pay service employees “minimum wages and benefits determined by the Secretary of Labor.” (U.S. ex rel. Sutton v. Double Day Office Services (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 531, 533.) “Its purpose is to protect employees of government contractors. Before the [SCA], the federal government had been ‘subsidizing’ substandard levels of compensation by awarding contracts to those who were able to bid low by paying less. [Citation.]” (Saavedra v. Donovan (9th Cir. 1983) 700 F.2d 496, 497.)

(Slip op., at p. 4.) After considering the pre-emption argument successfully raised by defendant at summary judgment, the Court concluded that the SCA did not pre-empt the Labor Code Claims at issue:

We therefore conclude that Naranjo’s action to recover additional wages under Labor Code section 226.7 neither conflicts with the SCA nor hinders the achievement of its goals. The wage determination attached to Spectrum’s contract sets forth the minimum basic wage rates for a large number of employment categories, including Naranjo’s category of detention officer; in addition, it contains provisions setting minimum rates for night pay, Sunday pay, and a “[h]azardous [p]ay [d]ifferential,” but none regarding additional pay for the denial of meal and rest breaks. Naranjo’s suit thus seeks state-required wages that exceed the minimum wages determined by the Secretary. In view of the language of the form clause in Spectrum’s contract and the authorities discussed above, Naranjo’s action under Labor Code section 226.7 does not conflict with the SCA and promotes, rather than impedes, its goals.

We reach the same conclusions regarding Naranjo’s claims under Labor Code sections 203 and 226. Labor Code section 203, subdivision (a), imposes a penalty upon employers who willfully fail to pay discharged employees their full compensation in a timely manner. Naranjo’s complaint seeks this penalty for the additional wages allegedly not paid under Labor Code section 226.7. As explained above, Naranjo may properly seek the wages in a state court without impeding the operation of the SCA. In view of Butler, we conclude that Naranjo’s litigation of his request for a penalty under Labor Code section 203 also would not hinder or conflict with the SCA.

Finally, Labor Code section 226 obliges employers to provide their employees with records of their earnings and deductions, and imposes penalties upon employers who knowingly and intentionally fail to supply the records. In contrast, under the SCA and its regulations, employers must maintain records and disclose them to the Secretary, but are not required to disclose the records to employees. (29 C.F.R. § 4.6(g)(1).) The employer’s sole duty regarding employees is to post a form notice in a prominent place regarding the wages and benefits required under the SCA. (29 C.F.R. §§ 4.183, 4.184.) The form clause in Spectrum’s contract specifying its SCA obligations imposes no duty upon Spectrum to provide wage and benefit records to its employees. (48 C.F.R. § 52.222-41(i).) As the evident goal of the employer’s recordkeeping duties under the SCA is to ensure compliance with the SCA, we conclude that Labor Code section 226 complements the SCA and facilitates its goals by enhancing scrutiny of the employers’ conduct.

(Slip op., at pp. 13-14.) The plaintiff did not address the trial court’s ruling of pre-emption as to claims for violation of the UCL, conversion, and injunctive relief. Having not raised those rulings as erroneous, the Court did not address them. And so another pre-emption argument fizzles.

The life cycles of these trends are interesting.  Consider, for example, the anti-class action arbitration provisions that were struck down in waves, or the run of decisions about class member identity discovery after Pioneer.  Makes you wonder how these issues manage to percolate up to the appellate level in such temporal proximity.  Probably coincidence, but maybe a vast defense conspiracy...

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Courtroom View Network provides sample video from Diet Drug trial opening statement

On March 9, 2009, I mentioned in a post that Courtroom View Network would be providing live and on-demand video coverage of the Diet Drug trial in the Los Angeles Superior Court, Judge Anthony Mohr presiding.  After that post, Courtroom View Network was kind enough to provide a long sample clip from the Opening Argument.  It's a chance to see how modern technology will change trial practice as it has existed for centuries, and I encourage you to have a look.

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“There you go again,” CJAC

In a March 12, 2009 blog post entitled Class Actions Slamming Our Courts, But Seldom Going to Trial, CJAC, once again, calls for an immediate right to appeal an order granting certification. Just like it did back in 2008, when it was supporting AB 1905, CJAC is back to denouncing the current class action device in California as something akin to a congealing mass that is paralyzing the gears of justice. This time CJAC’s campaign is in support of Assembly Bill 298, authored by Assembly Member Van Tran. However, CJAC is seemingly more concerned with creating an illusion of chaos than with offering a fair presentation of the data surrounding class actions. Starting with the title of its post, a quick search of Findings of the Study of California Class Action Litigation, 2000-2006 (“Study”) cited in CJAC’s post reveals no mention of Court’s getting “slammed” by class actions.

Continuing, CJAC says, “A just-released California Judicial Council report says that class action lawsuits are booming in California, but that only a small percentage (0.7%) ever go to trial.” Again, no mention in the Study that class action suits are booming, and the truth differs markedly from the hyberbole. According to the Study cited in CJAC’s blog post, “Study courts reported a total of 3,711 class action cases filed between 2000 and 2005.” (Study, at p. 3.) What will our system of justice do under the weight of so many class actions? It likely won’t notice them, as suggested by these additional statistics from the Judicial Council’s 2007 Court Statistics Report Introduction: “Civil filings totaled 1,418,490, and civil dispositions totaled 1,268,153 in FY 2005–2006.” Nearly one and one-half million civil filings in a one year period in California. Contrast that number with the paltry count of 3,711 class action cases in 6-year period, and the impressiveness of the class action filing numbers diminishes. Moreover, California’s class actions are routinely being handled in trial courts established under California’s Complex Civil Litigation Pilot Program. Those courts are uniquely positioned to handle complex cases, like class actions, efficiently and effectively.

CJAC’s post said, “The study found a 63% increase in class action filings between 2000 and 2005 in the 12 courts reviewed. The increase was in contrast to the overall civil filings, which decreased during that same time period.” But CJAC doesn’t mention the theories in the Study as to why that increase might have occurred. From the Study:

It is important to note that class action cases represent less than one-half of one percent of all unlimited civil filings in the study courts during the study period. Very few class action cases are filed as compared to the entire unlimited civil category and, as previously discussed, discreet events can create an immediate filing effect in the class action segment. For example, a natural disaster may cause a significant increase in insurance-related class action activity without affecting overall unlimited civil filings. Similarly, a change in the law, as in the CAFA example cited above, may also have an effect on this litigation type that is not seen elsewhere. Both of these examples could create observed divergences from unlimited civil filings that are unique to the class action arena. Thus, filing trends in the overall unlimited civil category are not reliable predictors of class action behavior.

(Study, at p. 4.) In other words, class actions, a tiny portion of all civil filings, may display reactions to significant events not discernable when examining the hundreds of thousands of unlimited civil filings each year or the millions of total filings each year.

But because the Study doesn’t actually do much to advance CJAC’s objectives, CJAC moves on to assertions having no connection to the Study: “Many cases settle immediately after class certification because defendants fear the large cost of going to trial and find it cheaper to settle whether the underlying claim has merit or not.” Really? Based on what? It can’t be the Study figures, which offer some surprising statistics, in a handy chart:

Certification status of disposed cases

Certification Status

n

Percent

No Certification

1,005

77.7%

Certified by motion OR as part of a settlement

277

21.4%

Certified by BOTH motion and as part of a settlement

12

0.9%

All Cases

1,294

100.0%

(Study, at p. C11, where n represents the number of cases in a category.) 77.7% of all class actions reaching a disposition during the Study period were not certified. Only 21.4% of all class actions were certified either as part of a settlement or as part of a contested certification motion. However, of the 1,294 class actions tracked in the sample group, 413 cases in this sample were resolved through settlement. (Study, at p. C1.) Comparing the 277 figure for certification for any reason (disputed or for settlement) to the 413 figure for any type of settlement, it is evident that at least 136 of the class actions in the sample settled on non-class terms, and possibly more than that. So much for image of defendants falling over themselves to settle class actions because of the fear of the massive costs associated with litigating a class action.  CJAC says, "If California law granted the defendant the same right to appeal the class certification decision, only valid class action cases could proceed."  Evidently, CJAC concludes that, even with 77.7% of the Study cases failing to achieve certification, even more of an impediment is needed.  CJAC also neglects to mention that some defendants may choose to settle class actions because they know that they violated the law and simply want a settlement discount on their liability.

But going further, what is different about a defendant settling a class action because it is cheaper than going to trial when compared to every defendant that settles an individual suit because it might be cheaper to settle, irrespective of merit? I once heard a mediator opine that, due to the costs of litigation, he estimated that no case with less than $75,000 in dispute should go to trial. CJAC’s position devolves into argumentum ad terrorem, with nothing of substance behind it.

Known as a “death knell” ruling, an order denying certification to an entire class is appealable because it is the legal equivalent of a dismissal of the action as to all members of the class other than the named plaintiff. (See, e.g., Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 C4th 429 (2000).) Absent class members must decide whether to file a tidal wave of individual suits, or abandon their rights. Allowing an appeal of the denial of certification is comparable to the right of appeal following the termination of a claim. A defendant, on the other hand, retains the right to challenge a claim on the merits after certification is granted. If the defendant prevails, that victory is enforceable against the entire class. If the defendant loses on the merits after certification, the defendant can then challenge both the certification order and the order on the merits on appeal. And if the defendant can’t beat certification and doesn’t prevail on the merits and can’t convince a court of appeal that any error of significance was responsible for the result below, then the system operated correctly.

The alternative is what CJAC wants: the immediate cessation of litigation in the trial court upon the issuance of an order granting or denying certification. And the class that may have been victimized by a defendant gets to sit by and wait several more years for recompense. Keep in mind that, even after certification is granted, a trial court can “decertify” a class if later-discovered information proves that course appropriate. In the CJAC universe, a defendant could appeal the granting of certification. Then, if that year and a half long detour to the Court of Appeal proved unsuccessful, the defendant could file a motion to decertify the class after remand. If that motion were denied, it, too, would likely generate an immediate right of appeal. Because there is no numerical limit on the number of times a defendant can seek decertification (other than the limit imposed by the need for “new” evidence to support the motion), the number of appeals of right could be staggering. In other words, the consequences of proposals like that contained in AB 298 would essentially place class actions in the deep freeze of appellate activity until the cost of litigation broke the plaintiff.

Has CJAC made the case for essentially destroying the rights of plaintiffs in cases that constitute less than one-half of one percent of all unlimited civil filings? Not even close. And if CJAC continues with its highly selective citation to statistics, it will also confirm for itself an absence of credibility in legal discourse.

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Sloppy security standards harm consumers, or what has VISA done for you lately?

At some time in 2008, Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., a NYSE company trading under the symbol HPY, and delivering credit/debit/prepaid card processing to businesses nationwide, was breached in a way that exposed up to 1.5 million credit cards to network hackers.  (See, Dan Goodin, US credit card payment house breached by sniffing malware (January 20, 2009) www.theregister.co.uk and Press Release: Heartland Payment Systems Uncovers Malicious Software In Its Processing System (January 20, 2009)  news.prnnewswire.com.)  Heartland then engaged in an effort to spin the breach, lauding the amazing efforts of its employees to deal with the situation and demanding industry date encryption reforms that it should have been using already.  (See, Press Release: Heartland CEO Calls for Industry Cooperation to Fight Cyber Criminals and Adoption of End-To-End Encryption (January 23, 2009) www.snl.com and Anthony M. Freed, Hearland Breach Bad As Tylenol Poisonings? (January 25, 2009) information-security-resources.com.)

Meanwhile, at least some questions have been asked about the timing of trades made by Hearland's CEO, as compared to when Heartland first suspected that it had been breached.  (See, Anthony M. Freed, Did Heartland CEO Make Insider Trades? (January 29, 2009) information-security-resources.com and Anthony M. Freed, Heartland Update: Reps Respond To Questions (February 1, 2009) information-security-resources.com.)  The SEC and other agencies are investigating Heartland following the breach.  (Robert McMillan, SEC, FTC Investigating Heartland After Data Theft (February 25, 2009) www.pcworld.com.)

Today, after doing little to publicize the breach, VISA declared Heartland out of compliance with the "Data Security Standards established by the Payment Card Industry Security Council."  (Dan Goodin, Visa yanks creds for payment card processing pair (March 13, 2009) www.theregister.co.uk and see Anthony M. Freed, Visa Puts Heartland on Probation Over Security Breach (March 13, 2009) seekingalpha.com.)  Frankly, I'm not impressed with the incredible speed of VISA's reaction to this mess.  I think it likely that, as Mr. Freed speculates, VISA is more worried about potential inclusion in the Dow Industrial Average than in exposing massive flaws in the transmission and processing of credit card transaction data.

This isn't just a theoretical harm either.  People have been arrested for using card data in Florida.  (Wauneta Breeze, Three Florida men arrested for using credit card data from Heartland breach (March 13, 2009) www.waunetanebraska.com.)  But consumers aren't the only victims.  I was notified by my financial institution that my VISA debit card may have been compromised.  I called to find out what may meant.  At the time, I speculated that the financial institution had been advised of a data breach and was notifying me pre-emptively.  Turns out I was right, but I had no idea about the scope of the breach.  In any case, I asked for some background and learned that this tiny financial institution had 2,500 customers on the Heartland breach list.  They said that they probably incurred about $10,000 in overtime wage expenses just handling the correspondence and new card mailings to customers.  I was told that there was little chance that the costs would be recovered.

Considering the state of encryption art and the fact that millions upon millions of people have data stored with companies like Heartland, there is no excuse for not implementing end-to-end, high-integrity encryption of all such data.  Eastern European hackers shouldn't be able to load a data logging virus into the network processing credit card transactions.  And if the data was encrypted internally at all stages, it wouldn't matter if they did.  Consider me not particularly troubled by the fact that Heartland's stock took a dive after this was announced.  Instead of worrying about when to exercise stock options, try worrying about keeping our data secure.

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in brief: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores already set for en banc hearing

Ninth Circuit SealOn February 13, 2009, the Ninth Circuit granted a request for en banc review of Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores (9th Cir. 2007) 509 F.3d 1168. On March 11, 2009, the Court issued a Corrected Notice of hearing, listing March 24, 2009, at 2:00 p.m., as the date and time for that en banc hearing in the San Francisco Courthouse of the Ninth Circuit. I don't know what a "normal" lag time is from granting en banc review to setting the hearing, but in appellate court years, that seems like nanoseconds to me. The UCL Practitioner has some detailed coverage of Dukes in this post collection.

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In Franco v. Athens Disposal Company, Inc., another "no class action" arbitartion clause bites the dust, and with a kicker

Greatsealcal100Today, in a putative class action asserting various Labor Code violations, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division One) invalidated as unconscionable an arbitration agreement containing a “no class action or private attorney general action (PAGA) clause” in Franco v. Athens Disposal Company, Inc. (March 10, 2009).

The Court held:

We conclude that the class arbitration waiver is unconscionable with respect to the alleged violations of the meal and rest period laws given “the modest size of the potential individual recovery, the potential for retaliation against members of the class, [and] the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their rights.” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 463 (Gentry).) In addition, because the arbitration agreement prevents plaintiff from acting as a private attorney general, it conflicts with the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (§§ 2698–2699.5) — an act that furthers Gentry’s goal of comprehensively enforcing state labor laws through statutory sanctions (see Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 462–463).

(Slip op., at p. 2.) But you have to admire the employer for the sheer chutzpah of it. A “no private attorney general” clause?  Bold, and daring.

The opinion is longer than you might expect.  Several preliminary issues required discussion before the Court moved to the meat of the issues.  And the Court provided an extensive discussion of both Gentry and the nature of PAGA actions.  If this happens to be your bailiwick, the opinion is a must read.  If you never confront arbitration agreements or wage & hour matters, move along - there is nothing to see here.

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