Despite pending Brinker case, Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. declares that standard for rest break applies to meal periods

In case you hadn't heard, Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) is pending before the California Supreme Court.  Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (2010), rev. denied (2010) held that certification of meal period claims was appropriate because, among other reasons, that unsettled meal period standard was also a classwide issue.  But in an unexpected twist, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight), in Hernandez v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., decided that, rather than recommending to the trial court that it certify the meal period claim and await Brinker, it would just tell us what that standard is right now.  And, according to the Hernandez Court, the meal period standard is the same standard that applies to rest breaks:

Hernandez admits employers must provide, i.e., authorize and permit, employees to take rest breaks, but contends a different standard applies to meal breaks and thus, the trial court‟s legal analysis was faulty. This contention is not persuasive. “The California Supreme Court has described the interest protected by meal break provisions, stating that „[a]n employee forced to forgo his or her meal period . . . has been deprived of the right to be free of the employer‟s control during the meal period.‟ Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1104 (2007). It is an employer's obligation to ensure that its employees are free from its control for thirty minutes, not to ensure that the employees do any particular thing during that time. Indeed, in characterizing violations of California meal period obligations in Murphy, the California Supreme Court repeatedly described it as an obligation not to force employees to work through breaks. [Citation.]” (Brown v. Federal Express Corp. (C.D.Cal. 2008) 249 F.R.D. 580, 585, fn. omitted.)

Slip op., at 11, emphasis in original.  The Court affirmatively adopts some of the specious arguments from district courts, including the notion that it would be too hard for employees to actually make employees take breaks:

Hernandez's position also is not practical. “Requiring enforcement of meal breaks would place an undue burden on employers whose employees are numerous or who . . . do not appear to remain in contact with the employer during the day. See White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F.Supp.2d 1080, 1088-89 (N.D.Cal.2007).

Slip op., at 13.  That argument is insulting.  Evidently an employer can control when employees come and go.  That's not too hard.  But they can't decide whether people work during other parts of the day.  Whatever standard is ultimately declared by the California Supreme Court, arguments like this cheapen the discussion.

Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court opines that it is perfectly fine to assess merits during certification.  It's a brave new world here in California.

Amended Order and Class Notice in Adoma v. University of Phoenix

While I don't regularly post Orders from federal cases I mention, I do so here by special request.  In University of Phoenix, Inc., the District Court (Eastern District of California, Judge Karlton presiding) issued an Order on October 15, 2010, approving in part and modifying in part a proposed Class Notice.  On October 20, 2010, the Court issued an amended Order.  The Amended Order and attached Notice are available through the Acrobat.com links below:

• Amended Order
• Notice

District Court evaluates proper class notice in Adoma v. University of Phoenix, Inc.

United States Senior District Court Judge Lawrence K. Karlton (Eastern District of California) examined the contents of a class notice proposed by the plaintiff in Adoma v. University of Phoenix, Inc., 2010 WL 4054109 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010).  The lawsuit alleges state law wage & hour claims, including allegations of off-the-clock work and break violations.  The Court certified the class.  The plaintiff moved for approval of a proposed Class Notice.  The Court's Order provides a good discussion of the appropriate contents in a class notice.

District Court denies motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration while Concepcion is pending

United States District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte (Northern District of California) denied a motion to compel arbitration, dismiss claims, or stay the matter.  Weisblatt v. Apple, Inc., 2010 WL 4071147 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010).  The suit concerns the change away from the unlimited data plan associated with the Apple 3G-enabled iPad.  AT&T Mobility LLC moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss all claims against it.  In the alternative, AT&T Mobility moved for a stay pending a Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 3322, 176 L.Ed.2d 1218 (2010) (No. 09-893).  Defendant Apple joined in the motion to stay.

The Court denied the motion, without prejudice, saying:

Given the likelihood that the Supreme Court will speak directly to the class action waiver issue in Concepcion, compelling arbitration at this point would be unwarranted. Even though plaintiffs' arguments regarding the unconscionability of the class action waiver may have less merit under New York law, a Supreme Court decision in Concepcion is still likely to simplify the issue. Accordingly, ATTM's motion to compel arbitration is denied without prejudice.

Slip op., at 3.  The Court went on to hold:

On balance, the court finds that a stay is unwarranted. That said, the claims with respect to ATTM will likely be affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion.  Accordingly, it makes little sense to begin discovery with respect to the claims focused on ATTM. Also, the court at this time declines to decide whether plaintiff Hanna's iPhone 3GS arbitration agreement now applies to his iPad dispute. In any event, Concepcion is likely to clarify the enforceability of the iPhone 3GS arbitration agreement as well as the iPad arbitration agreement.

Slip op., at 4.  The Court then limited discovery to written discovery against Apple.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of October 18, 2010

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on October 20, 2010. Notable results include: 

• On a Petition for Review, review was denied in Morgan v. United Retail (July 13, 2010) [obligations under Labor Code section 226], covered previously here.
• On a Petition for Review, review was granted in Aryeh v. Cannon Business Solutions (June 22, 2010).  In Aryeh, the plaintiff argued that a continuing violation theory applied to his UCL claim, extending the period during which he could bring a claim.  The Court of Appeal rejected that argument. 

Adobe announces Acrobat X and related service enhancements

Earlier today Adobe announced the soon-to-be-released Acrobat X family of products.  Having seen a demonstration of some pre-release features, I can say that Acrobat X looks like it will accomplish several important things from the standpoint of legal practitioners.  For example, the automation tools will increase the ease with which attorneys and support staff process documents.  PDF Portfolios receive several enhancements, including the ability to control the order of documents in the PDF Portfolio (if you haven't used this feature, it is essentially using the PDF as a wrapper around a number of different document types - the documents are packaged much like an electronic binder, complete with a cover page and designer color schemes).

Acrobat.com will add an explicit tool to do what I've been manually using it for since Acrobat.com first went live.  The SendNow tool will allow users to send large files that might not successfully move through e-mail systems.  The SendNow tool will provide delivery receipts, a helpful addition for document delivery.

Personally, I am also interested in the prospect of SharePoint integration.  Combined with improvements to SharePoint functions and improved SharePoint features available through Office 2010, SharePoint might make a very serviceable substitute for the pricey document management services that target the legal industry.

I will be sure to give Acrobat X a test drive when it is available and let you know how quickly you should look to update your stale version of Acrobat.  Here's a hint that doesn't even require a test drive - if you are using Acrobat 7 or below, you must rush to upgrade; if you are using Acrobat 8, you should give some serious thought to upgrading at your earliest convenience.  I'll let you know if you get enough out of the jump from Acrobat 9 to Acrobat X to justify the same recommendation that I give for versions 8 and below.

20th Annual Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Institute

On October 21, 2010, the Antitrust section of the State Bar will hold the 20th Annual Golden State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Institute.  The full day program will offer concurrent tracks for UCL and Antitrust topics.  I will be moderating the last panel of the day, on UCL Remedies and Defenses.  Anyone not already asleep by then should consume less coffee.  For more information, visit the Golden State Institute page of the State Bar website.

Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc. is vacated; new opinion remands the matter for further proceedings

Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., No. 09-14107, slip op. (11th Cir. July 19, 2010), held that at least one plaintiff in a class action must meet the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  Today, the panel said, "Subsequent reflection has led us to conclude that our interpretation was incorrect. Specifically, CAFA’s text does not require at least one plaintiff in a class action to meet the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)."  Slip op., at 2.  Perhaps the initial opinion was trial balloon.  It did not float.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of October 11, 2010

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on October 13, 2010.  Notable results include:

• On a Petition for Review, a grant and hold was issued in Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (June 24, 2010), covered previously here.

I previously wrote that the opinion in Faulkinbury offered nothing interesting in my opinion.  The Court of Appeal simply repeated the refrain that the trial court has fairly broad discretion when ruling on a motion for class certification.  However, after Wednesday, Faulkinbury just got more interesting.  The Supreme Court issued its grant and hold pending...wait for it...the outcome in Brinker.  One might surmise that the standard applied by the trial court in Faulkinbury may be materially affected by the outcome of Brinker.  That's interesting.  It suggests that the Supreme Court is thinking about how the certification process will be impacted by its ruling in Brinker.  In fact, the Supreme Court may already have some tentative thoughts about the likelihood of that occurring.  After all, since the trial court denied certification of a meal period claim in Faulkinbury, one could suppose that the Supreme Court is leaning towards a decision in Brinker that would change that result.

District Court denies certification in suit challenging property intrusions by telecommunications company Qwest Communications

United States District Court Judge William B. Schubb (Eastern District of California) denied, for the second time in the suit, a motion for class certification in a suit contesting the use of railroad right-of-ways by Qwest Communications International, Inc. (and other companies) to install fiber optic lines.   Regan v. Qwest Communications Intern., Inc., 2010 WL 3941471 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010). The Court found that typicality issues of individual land ownership and the commonality problems relating to the many statutes conveying land in different ways were insurmountable problems.  For example, the Court said the following:

With regard to the miles of right-of-way subject to private conveyances, plaintiffs argue the individual deeds can be placed in groups based on common conveyance language and the court can decide motions for partial summary judgment with respect to each group on the fee versus easement issue. While plaintiffs have submitted a handful of such conveyances from the same railroad route in Kings County, California in order to show that these conveyances can use identical or similar language, (Ex. to Supp. Millea Aff. (Docket No. 193) Ex. B), the court has no evidence that there is a limited range of granting language or that there will be a limited number of potential deed “groups.” See Kirkman v. N.C. R. Co., 220 F.R.D. 40 (M.D.N.C.2004). When the private conveyances number somewhere between five hundred and two thousand, spanning hundreds of miles and multiple railroad routes, plaintiffs' offering is no assurance that interpretation of private deeds is a “common” issue at all.

Slip op., at 7.