Pendergrass Rule Ends Run a Little Shy of 80 Years

Since Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal. 2d 258, 263 (1935) (Pendergrass), California Courts have, to various degrees, excluded evidence of fraud when the fraud is directly contrary to the terms of a written agreement.  In Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association (January 14, 2013), the California Supreme Court revisited the Pendergrass rule, concluding that it was time to overrule Pendergrass.

The plaintiffs in Riverisland restructured debt, secured by real property. They defaulted and the Association recorded a notice of default. After the plaintiffs repaid their loan, the Association dismissed the foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiffs then sued for fraud, contending that they were promised two years of forbearance by the Association’s Vice President in exchange for additional collateral. The plaintiffs did not read the subsequently prepared agreement and simply signed it. The trial court granted summary judgment, excluding evidence of fraud at odds with the writing pursuant to the Pendergrass rule. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, narrowly construing Pendergrass. The Supreme Court granted review.

The Supreme Court observed that the Pendergrass rule has been criticized but followed by California courts, although Courts attempting to avoid its result have narrowly construed it.  The Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeal in this case adopted such a narrow construction, deciding that evidence of an alleged oral misrepresentation of the written terms themselves is not barred by the Pendergrass rule.

Plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to reconsider Pendergrass.  The Court agreed that there were good reasons to do so:

There are good reasons for doing so. The Pendergrass limitation finds no support in the language of the statute codifying the parol evidence rule and the exception for evidence of fraud. It is difficult to apply. It conflicts with the doctrine of the Restatements, most treatises, and the majority of our sister-state jurisdictions. Furthermore, while intended to prevent fraud, the rule established in Pendergrass may actually provide a shield for fraudulent conduct. Finally, Pendergrass departed from established California law at the time it was decided, and neither acknowledged nor justified the abrogation. We now conclude that Pendergrass was ill-considered, and should be overruled.

Slip op., at 2.

While this case arises in the context of an individual suit for fraud, it provides substantial relief for consumer class action cases alleging claims of fraud stemming from misrepresentations about the subject of a later written agreement.

In Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., Sprint's call cannot be completed as dialed

I did warn you, but in the post below, so you might not be aware that you were warned.  In Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (October 29, 2012), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Five) had yet more work to do in the long-running saga of the Cellphone Termination Fee Cases.  In Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 193 Cal. App. 4th 298 (2011) the Court affirmed a December 2008 judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in this class action against Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (Sprint).  The Court also affirmed the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs a partial new trial on the issue of Sprint's actual damages and the calculation of a setoff to which Sprint might be entitled.  The case was then remanded for further proceedings limited to those issues.  But, when the matter returned to the trial court, Sprint moved to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims, the same claims addressed in the Court's affirmance of the 2008 judgment.  The trial court declined to consider the motion, finding that jurisdiction on remand was limited to the issues set forth in the Court's opinion.

While this sounds like it could be a case about arbitration law, it isn't.  It is entirely a decision about trial court jurisdiction after an appeal and remand with directions:

As the language of the cited cases indicates, the rule requiring a trial court to follow the terms of the remittitur is jurisdictional in nature. (People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1367 (Dutra).) The issues the trial court may address in the remand proceedings are therefore limited to those specified in the reviewing court‘s directions, and if the reviewing court does not direct the trial court to take a particular action or make a particular determination, the trial court is not authorized to do so. (Bach, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 302, 303, 304; accord, Hanna v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 363, 376 (Hanna) [where on prior appeal reviewing court did not direct trial court on remand to determine whether statutory violations had occurred, any such determination would be in excess of jurisdiction on remand].)

Slip op., at 8.  The Court then explained that a new trial on damages only did not open the door for the trial court to consider other issues raised by Sprint.

Court of Appeal declines to extend Lebrilla "crash parts" holding to all non-OEM parts installed under insurance policy

Lebrilla v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 1070 (2004) reversed a trial court's denial of certification in a suit against an automobile insurer.  The suit alleged that sheet metal parts known as "crash parts" were used to effectuate accident repairs, but the "crash parts" were not manufactured by original equipment manufacturers.  The use of "crash parts" allegedly resulted in substandard repairs that did not restore damaged vehicles to pre-loss condition.  In Ortega v. Topa Insurance Company (May 24, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) examined a similar, but not identical situation, in which non-OEM parts were used to complete repairs to vehicles.  The trial court concluded that common issues could not predominate when evaluation of a breach of contract claim would require a comparison of each installed non-OEM part to the OEM equivalent to determine whether the repair part was inferior to the OEM part.

The Court of Appeal agreed:

We do not read Lebrilla v. Farmers Group, Inc., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 1070, to suggest, for example, that all non-OEM replacement parts are uniformly inferior. That case addressed crash parts. (Id. at p. 1073 & fn. 1.) In this case, to recover damages each member of the putative Steered Claimant Class (Class B) must identify the non-OEM part, which includes radiators and heat and cooling systems, among others, and prove the particular manufacturer's part is inferior. Thus, unlike Lebrilla, the court would have to determine whether the installed repair part is inferior. As alleged, common issues do not predominate.

Slip op., at 18.  Pretty straightforward analysis.  When the issue was the adequacy of "crash parts," the question of their adequacy could be resolved on a classwide basis.  Here, the the issue of adequacy could vary wildly, depending upon what part was replaced and what manufacturer supplied the replacement part.  This particular case provides an example of the relatively narrow category of class complaints that reveal predominance issues on the face of the complaint itself.

Do NOT cite opinions after review is granted by the California Supreme Court (even if you claim you aren't relying on them). Stop. No. Don't. I see that.

Generally speaking, unpublished cases cannot be cited or relied upon by parties or courts.  California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 states, in part: "Except as provided in (b), an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action."  Cal. Rules Ct., rule 8.1115(a).  The only exceptions arise when the same parties are involved, or the conduct of a party in one case is relevant in criminal or disciplinary proceedings in another.  When review of a published case is granted by the California Supreme Court, it is depublished: "Unless otherwise ordered under (2), an opinion is no longer considered published if the Supreme Court grants review or the rendering court grants rehearing."  Cal. Rules Ct., rule 8.1105(e).  In The People v. E*Poly Star, Inc. (May 14, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) let E*Poly and the Trial Court have it for referencing Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1159, review granted Oct. 20, 2010 (S184929) (Aryeh).

On the issue of improper citation of an unpublished decision, the Court said:

Supreme Court review in Aryeh was granted on October 20, 2010 (S184929), more than a month prior to the filing of the district attorneys' lawsuit. As of that date any citation to, or reliance upon, that decision was expressly prohibited by rule 8.1115(a) of the California Rules of Court except under the limited circumstances set forth in rule 8.1115(b), none of which appears to be applicable to the case at bar. (See rule 8.1105(e)(1) [“[u]nless otherwise ordered . . ., an opinion is no longer considered published if the Supreme Court grants review”].) Nonetheless, employing something akin to the rhetorical device formally known as paraleipsis or apophasis—that is, mentioning something while disclaiming any intention of mentioning it—E*Poly Star in the trial court and once again in its brief in this court, after noting the Court of Appeal decision in Aryeh is not citable, has discussed the case at length and argues we should defer to its reasoning.  This use of an unpublished, noncitable opinion is a direct violation of rule 8.1115(a) and is wholly unacceptable. (Cf. rule 8.276(a)(4) [authorizing sanctions on the court's own motion for any unreasonable violation of the Rules of Court].)

Slip op., at 12-13 (footnote references omitted).  But the Court wasn't done, stating in a footnote:

E*Poly Star's improper use of Aryeh transcends suggesting we consider the case for its persuasive value. While purporting to recognize the split panel decision by our colleagues in Division Eight is no longer even citable, E*Poly Star contends it is, in fact, binding on us: “It is respectfully submitted that it is not the function of this reviewing court to second-guess itself and re-address a prior published decision, merely and especially because the decision is being reviewed by the State Supreme Court.” That is simply wrong. Even were the case still published, we would not be obligated to adopt its result; there is no “horizontal stare decisis” in the Court of Appeal. (Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1489, fn. 10; In re Marriage of Shaban (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 398, 409.) Although, as E*Poly Star states, we frequently follow a prior decision by another division of this court or another district, we will not do so if there is reason to disagree with the conclusion of that case. (People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 847; Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 485.)

Slip op., at 12.  "Horizontal stare decisis."  Priceless.  There really ARE some things money can't buy.

Ending its discussion of the use of uncitable authority, the Court also chided the Trial Court:

Similarly, the trial court's reference to the Aryeh opinion and its implicit adoption of its holding with the statement it “agrees with Aryeh's analysis” constitute an impermissible use of a noncitable decision. If the trial court is somehow familiar with an unpublished opinion and finds its analysis persuasive, then it is free to utilize that analysis, just as courts may adopt as their own the analysis contained in the parties' briefs. Any reference to the unpublished case itself, however, violates rule 8.1115(a) even if, as here, accompanied by the qualification, “even though not citable.”

Slip op., at 13.  I saw this happen several times while Brinker was pending.  A number of trial courts observed that Brinker was under review but then said that they agreed with its analysis and were adopting it.  Naughty.

The Court also discusses statute of limitation and accrual issues that may be impacted by Aryeh, but I thought the discussion of uncitable authority was a lot more entertaining than a discussion that could be mooted by Aryeh and might be nullified on a grant and hold pending Aryeh in any event.

Alvarez v. Brookstone Company, Inc. holds that Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. applies retrospectively

Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 51 Cal. 4th 524 (2011) (Pineda) held that the collection of ZIP codes as part of a credit card transaction is conduct that violates Civil Code section 1747.08.  In Alvarez v. Brookstone Company, Inc. (pub. ord. January 18, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) considered whether Pineda applied retrospectively to conduct occurring prior to that decision.  The Court had little difficulty concluding that the holding of Pineda applied retrospectively:

Pineda expressly concluded: "[T]he only reasonable interpretation of section 1747.08 is that personal identification information includes a cardholder's ZIP code." (Pineda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 534, italics added.) Therefore, despite Brookstone's attempts to show the contrary, the California Supreme Court held that its interpretation of section 1747.08 was the only reasonable interpretation of that statute. Pineda further concluded section 1747.08 "provides constitutionally adequate notice of proscribed conduct." (Id. at p. 536.) We reject Brookstone's due process argument that it did not have fair notice or warning of section 1747.08's prohibition against requesting and recording the ZIP codes of customers during credit card transactions.

Slip op., at 7.

Court revives claims of failure to disclose and active concealment of defects from computer purchasers

Reporting on this case pains me greatly.  I should be pleased to report on a CLRA and UCL decision that revives consumer claims.  But all I feel is pain.  Let me explain by quoting from the case.  The very first sentence says, "In this class action alleging a failure to disclose a computer defect involving a microchip that controlled floppy disk data transmission, plaintiffs Tammy Collins and Rudolph Roma appeal from a judgment on the pleadings."  Huh?  Floppy disk data transmission.  Rings a bell.  Nope, can't place it.  Must be some highfalutin, newfangled technology.  I recognize "data."  Anyhow, in Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (pub. ord. December 21, 2011), the Court reviewed a trial court order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

It was alleged that defendant failed to disclose and actively concealed the disk controller defect from potential purchasers. Despite knowing of the defect and knowing that the defect could result in critical data corruption, executives of eMachines directed the company to continue to sell the defective computers after October 31, 1999. eMachines actively concealed the existence of the defect from purchasers by, among other practices specified in the FAC, continuing to issue the warranty knowing the computers had the defect, and engaging in misleading “customer service” practices that concealed the defect in online “customer support” guides, in customer service diagnoses of computer problems, and at call centers.  The case was stayed for four years while cases in other states moved forward.

Turning first to the CLRA, the Court restated the LiMandri circumstances giving rise to actionable deceit.  The Court recognized the FAC as alleging factor (2), when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff, and factor (3), when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff.  The Court then agreed that a "reasonable" consumer would certainly find data corruption to be material information in connection with a computer.

Next, the Court distinguished Daugherty, observing that, in Daugherty, the only represetation made was the warranty, and the vehicles performed adequately as warranted.  The Court was similarly dismissive of Bardin, in which it was alleged that exhaust manifolds were likely to fail after the warranty period.  The Court explained that the manifolds in Bardin worked they way they were supposed to under the warranty.  Contrasting the circumstances, the Court said, "Because a floppy disk, at the time of the complaint, was integral to the storage, access, and transport of accurate computer data, the floppy disk was central to the function of a computer as a computer. The exhaust manifolds at issue in Bardin, by contrast, were just blowing smoke."  Slip op., at 12.  That's funny.  You see, the exhaust manifold vents combustion byproducts...

Regarding the UCL, the Court relied on its discussion about Daugherty and Bardin to conclude that a claim under the UCL was easily stated as well.  The Court agreed that consumers certainly had an expectation about data integrity when they purchased the affected computers.

After also concluding that the allegations supported a claim for common law fraud, the Court concluded that legal remedies were adequate, rendering an unjust enrichment claim unnecessary.

I should also tag this one with "Dinosaurs," given the discussion of floppy disk drives.  That reminds me that I should tell you about the time I saved data on a bent floppy disk drive by removing the casing and putting the raw disk in a disk drive.  The year was 1985.  Madonna, Huey Lewis, Duran Duran and Wham! were dominating the charts...

[extended period of blank stares]

...and that's how I saved all that data!

Strong-ARM tactics dealt a stunning setback in Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc.

After the great real estate implosion, lenders have been very busy, attempting to justify a number of questionable practices and products.  One such loan product, the Option ARM, has been challenged in state and federal courts.  Option ARM loans are complex forms of adjustable rate loans that generally include several payments options during the early years of the loan.  One payment option includes the ability to make a "minimum" payment for several years.  However, many Option ARM loan minimum payments are insufficient to pay accruing interest after an initial "teaser" interest rate that is very low.  Once the "teaser" rate period expires, the unpaid interest is added onto the loan, increasing the principal balance owed on the loan (negative amortization).  Because of their complexity, clear disclosures to borrowers are essential.  In Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (August 10, 2011), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) held that a complaint alleging a lender's failure to disclose that negative amortization would definitely occur (instead describing that scenario as merely possible), was sufficient to state violations of the UCL and common law fraud.

The Court described the claims of the Second Amended Complaint:

The gravamen of plaintiffs' operative complaint is that defendant failed to disclose prior to plaintiffs entering into their Option ARMs: (1) "the loans were designed to cause negative amortization to occur"; (2) "the monthly payment amounts listed in the loan documents for the first two to five years of the loans were based entirely upon a low 'teaser' interest rate (though not disclosed as such by Defendants) which existed for only a single month and which was substantially lower than the actual interest rate that would be charged, such that these payment amounts would never be sufficient to pay the interest due each month"; and (3) "when [plaintiffs] followed the contractual payment schedule in the loan documents, negative amortization was certain to occur, resulting in a significant loss of equity in borrowers' homes, and making it much more difficult for borrowers to refinance the loans [because of the prepayment penalty included in the loan for paying off the loan within the first three years of the loan]; thus, as each month passed, the homeowners would actually owe more money than they did at the outset of the loan, with less time to repay it."

Slip op., at 13.  The Court began its analysis by explaining what was not at issue in the case at this time:

It is important to demarcate the boundaries of this dispute. The following is not at issue in this case: (1) should it be legal to offer Option ARMs to typical mortgage borrowers; and (2) should it be legal to utilize "teaser" ("discounted") interest rates (here 1.25 percent for the first month of a 30 year loan), which bear no relation to the actual cost of credit? Our only concern in this case is whether plaintiffs stated a cause of action under state law based on defendant‘s allegedly misleading, incomplete, and/or inaccurate disclosures in the Option ARM documents provided to plaintiffs.

Slip op., at 15.  The Court then observed that no California state court had addressed the exact issues presented in the case.  However, the Court noted that a number of federal courts had examined similar issues.

The Court began by addressing the Defendant's contention that strict compliance with TILA provided it with a safe harbor of sorts:

A string of cases (involving strikingly similar Option ARM forms/disclosures to those used in the instant case) have held that a borrower states a claim for a violation of TILA based on, among other disclosure deficiencies, the failure of the lender to clearly state that making payments pursuant to the TILDS payment schedule will result in negative amortization during the initial years of the loan.

Slip op., at 18.  The Court concluded that, since the allegations could support a cause of action for TILA violations, it would be nonsensical to dismiss the claims at this stage, based on a claim of compliance with TILA disclosure obligations.  Note:  There was no TILA claim asserted in this action, only UCL and fraudulent concealment claims.

Next, the Court considered the state law fradulent concealment claims.  The Court began its discussion by citing a number of federal cases that allowed state law claims to proceed along with TILA claims.  The Court then turned to the sufficiency of the fraud pleading.  The Court found that the failure to disclose the exceedingly low teaser rate adequately was a sufficient omission to suppor the fraudulent concealment claim: "The teaser rate creates an artificially low (compared to the actual cost of credit) initial payment schedule and guarantees that the actual applicable interest rate (after the first month of the loan) will exceed the interest rate used to calculate the payment schedule for the initial years of the loan."  Slip op., at 24.

Turning to the UCL, the Court found that the allegations were sufficient to support a UCL under all three prongs.  The "unfair" prong discussion was the most interesting of the three:

As noted above in our discussion of damages, it may be difficult for plaintiffs to prove they could not have avoided any of the harm of negative amortization — they could have simply paid more each month once they discovered their required payment was not sufficient to pay off the interest accruing on the loan. But plaintiffs may show they were unable to avoid some substantial negative amortization. And we see no countervailing value in defendant's practice of providing general, byzantine descriptions of Option ARMs, with no clear disclosures explaining that, with regard to plaintiffs' particular loans, negative amortization would certainly occur if payments were made according to the payment schedule. To the contrary, a compelling argument can be made that lenders should be discouraged from competing by offering misleading teaser rates and low scheduled initial payments (rather than competing with regard to low effective interest rates, low fees, and economically sustainable payment schedules). Finally, to the extent an "unfair" claim must be "tethered" to specific statutory or regulatory provisions, TILA and Regulation Z provide an adequate tether even though plaintiffs are not directly relying on federal law to make their claims.

Slip op., at 29.

Fun fact: the Court cited Kwikset when rejecting the Defendant's contention that the Plaintiffs did not adequately allege standing under the UCL.

Disclosure:  J. Mark Moore of Spiro Moss argued this matter before the Court of Appeal and contributed significantly to the briefing on appeal.

An objector has no standing to challenge a class action fee award where he has no financial interest in the award and fails to show harm as a result of the award

In Glasser v. Volkswagon of American, Inc. (9th Cir. May 17, 2011), the Ninth Circuit considered objector-appellant David Murray's contention that the district court erred when it awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff-appellee Jacob Glasser.  Glasser challenged the inadequacy of disclosures by Volkswagon about the limited availability of "smart keys" for certain Audi and Volkswagon vehicles.  Soon after the case was filed, the parties initiated settlement discussions.  As part of those discussions, Glasser evidently learned that replacement key technology was available through independent dealers and agreed that Volkswagon had not fixed the price of replacement keys.  Volkswagon agreed to make additional disclosures about "smart keys," but no monetary benefit was obtained for the class.

The trial court approved a settlement in which the class was notified of the agreement to make new disclosures and Volkswagon's agreement to either pay an agreed-upon amount of attorney's fees or let the trial court decide fees if the parties did not reach agreement on that issue.  Murry filed an objection to the settlement.  The district court awarded plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $417,663.75, costs and expenses in the amount of $16,614.40, and an incentive award to Glasser in the amount of $2,500.

The Court began with a discussion of Article III standing.  The Court observed that fees paid from common funds confer standing on objectors because the fees reduce the fund:

When attorneys’ fees are paid out of a common fund, from which both the class recovery and the fee award are paid, a class member who participates in the settlement generally has standing to challenge the fee award because any reduction in the fee award results in an increase to the class recovery.

Slip op., at 6356.  But the Court then concluded that Murray failed to satisfy his obligation to establish Article III standing:

Murray does not contend that Plaintiff’s counsel colluded with VW to orchestrate an excessively high fee award in exchange for an unfair settlement for the class. Had he alleged as much, he may have been able to meet the requirements of Article III standing under a “constructive common fund theory.” See Lobatz, 222 F.3d at 1147. However, Murray has expressly disclaimed recovery under a “constructive common fund” theory. Instead, he argues Plaintiff’s claims were entirely meritless from the beginning of the lawsuit. Further, he claims only that an excess fee award will cause VW to pass along the cost to its shareholders and customers, and that he may somehow benefit as a consumer from any savings that may result from the denial or reduction of the award.

Slip op., at 6537.  The appeal was then dismissed for lack of standing.  Oops.  I suppose an assertion of a "constructive common fund" theory will become the new standard refrain for objectors, particularly in consumer class actions.

Legislative reaction to AT&T v. Concepcion: Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson announce legislation in response

From Sentator Franken's official site:

After consumers were dealt a blow today when the Supreme Court ruled that companies can ban class action suits in contracts, U.S. Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) said today they plan to introduce legislation next week that would restore consumers' rights to seek justice in the courts. Their bill, called the Arbitration Fairness Act, would eliminate forced arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, and civil rights cases, and would allow consumers and workers to choose arbitration after a dispute occurred.

Many businesses rely on mandatory and binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements that force consumers and employees to settle any dispute with a company providing products or services without the benefit of legal recourse.

"This ruling is another example of the Supreme Court favoring corporations over consumers," said Sen. Franken. "The Arbitration Fairness Act would help rectify the Court's most recent wrong by restoring consumer rights. Consumers play an important role in holding corporations accountable, and this legislation will ensure that consumers in Minnesota and nationwide can continue to play this crucial role."

"Powerful companies who take advantage of ordinary consumers must be held accountable," said Sen. Blumenthal. "Today's misguided Supreme Court ruling is a setback for millions of Americans, denying injured consumers access to justice. The Arbitration Fairness Act would reverse this decision and restore the long-held rights of consumers to hold corporations accountable for their misdeeds."

"Forced arbitration agreements undermine our indelible Constitutional right to trial by jury, benefiting powerful businesses at the expense of American consumers and workers," said Rep. Johnson. "Americans with few choices in the marketplace may unknowingly cede their rights when they enter contracts to buy a home or a cell phone, place a loved one in a nursing home, or start a new job. We must fight to defend our rights and re-empower consumers."

In Concepcion v. AT&T, consumers brought a claim against AT&T for false advertising. However, because the value of their case was only $30, their case was consolidated into a class action. AT&T sought to block the lawsuit by pointing to the mandatory arbitration clause in the service contract but lower courts applying state law rightly invalidated the arbitration clause because it banned class actions entirely.

In today's 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court overturned these lower court decisions which sought to protect consumers. The majority of the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act barred state courts from protecting consumers from these arbitration clauses. The effect of this decision essentially insulates companies from liability when they defraud a large number of customers of a relatively small amount of money.

A longtime advocate for consumers and workers in cases of forced arbitration, in 2009 Sen. Franken passed legislation with bipartisan support that restricts funding to defense contractors who commit employees to mandatory binding arbitration in the case of sexual assault and other civil rights violations. Congressman Johnson, a longtime champion of workers and consumer rights, first introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act in 2007.

McDonald's sued to stop it from offering toys in Happy Meals; Opponents of personal responsibility celebrate

According to Reuters, the Center for Science in the Public Interest is representing a mother of two in a suit agasint McDonald's.  The suit alleges violation of California consumer protection laws.  McDonald's removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

I have a kid.  I sometimes let her eat McDonald's.  I could say no to a request to eat there.  That's my choice.  But if McDonald's axes Happy Meal toys to deal with these claims, then I will have less choice, thanks to people that think they can do a better job than I can of raising my child.  Have we completely lost our minds?  Plenty of companies do actual, real, bad things.  We just dilute attention from real misconduct when we shove responsibility for our sloth and inattention onto businesses.  Underpaying employees: bad.  Undisclosed toxins in food or medication: bad.  Defrauding investors: bad.  Kids eating too much junk food: lack of parental discipline (unless the children are out buying their own food, in which case it is a lack of parental oversight).