A second round of thanks to all blog visitors and supporting blogs

It took about 30 days to reach the 1,500 visit mark.  The next 1,500 visits took about 15 days.  I attribute much of the daily visit growth to the support of a number of very successful blogs, including Wage Law, UCL Practitioner, The California Blog of Appeal, ClassActionBlawg.com, and California Punitive Damages.  Other sites, like Overlawyered.com, also directed quite a bit of traffic here to read specific posts.  Justia.com pushed a fair bit of traffic here as well.  Thanks to everyone, and if I didn't list your blog as a source of referrrals, it isn't because I don't appreciate it, it is because I'm out of time to post right now.

Thank you for your support and consideration,

H. Scott Leviant, on behalf of The Complex Litigator

Read More

In Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, the Borello “right to control” and related factors were again applied to find an employer-employee relationship

Greatsealcal100Because employers reap substantial savings when independent contractors can satisfy the needs of a business in place of employees, there is a financial incentive to misclassify employees as independent contractors. Decisional authority agrees that, due to the “infinite variety of service arrangements,” it is difficult to formulate a single test or standard that can determine whether an individual should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor. (S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 350 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543].)

In Borello, the California Supreme Court collected its decisions on the determination of an employment relationship. Borello held that “ ‘[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired....’ ” (Borello, at p. 350.) Borello then discussed “secondary” indicia of the nature of the service relationship. First, Borello said that “ ‘[s]trong evidence in support of an employment relationship is the right to discharge at will, without cause.’ ” (Ibid.) Borello then summarized other “secondary” indicia of employment status:

Additional factors have been derived principally from the Restatement Second of Agency. These include (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.

(Borello, at p. 351.) Since Borello, defendants have chafed at reliance upon Borello outside of the worker’s compensation context. Those challenges have uniformly been rejected:

Read More

COMPLEX TECH: The Ironkey USB key delivers unprecedented security for critical data

Ironkey_logo_web225Recently, The Complex Litigator discussed the topic of data encryption to protect confidential client data.  Now, as part of the ongoing COMPLEX TECH series, The Complex Litigator will cover various data encryption solutions.  In this post, I will profile what appears to be nothing more that a slightly-larger-than-normal USB key, the Ironkey.

"Ironkey" is appropriate for a number of reasons.  First, the IronKey is designed so that it cannot be physically tampered with or disassembled by a determined hacker.  The IronKey is encased in a rugged metal housing, not plastic. It is one of the strongest USB devices you can buy.  The interior of the IronKey is filled solid with an epoxy-based potting compound. This seals in all the components and prevents the IronKey from being crushed, even under extremely high pressure. The process of trying to remove encrypted data from the flash chips would be extremely difficult, time-consuming and almost certainly destroy the chips and connections inside. Such an attempt would cause permanent, noticeable damage.

The IronKey has tested, passed, and exceeded military waterproof standards (MIL-STD-810F).  The Ironkey can survive a swim in the pool or a trip through the washing machine.

Read More

Utilizing the rarely seen "defendant class" approach, a Mother's Day class action is filed against ungrateful children

In honor of Mother's Day, The Complex Litigator has tracked down something special.  According to a press release on PR*Urgent, a press release service, "[a] special Mother’s Day class action suit has been filed against ungrateful children everywhere. . . ."  (See, Mother’s Day Class Action Suit Against Ungrateful Children (May 9, 2008) www.prurgent.com.)  Although not mention in the press release, the fact that this class action has been brought against "ungrateful children everywhere" suggests that, in addition to a conventional plaintiff class of mothers, the creative counsel that devised this action must have a defendant class in mind as well.  Of particular interest will be the method by which notice is provided to the defendant class if the action is certified.  Perhaps via printed notice on the side of Happy Meals.  That would be the functional equivalent of individual notice.

Additional facts are included in the complaint:

Read More

To improve legal writing, dump the nominalizations

At Legalwriting.net, Wayne Schiess discusses the abuse heaped upon the English language when lawyers use nouns that wanted to be verbs.  What are "nouns that wanted to be verbs?"  Wayne explains:

Nouns that wanted to be verbs go by many names: nominalizations, hidden verbs, buried verbs. I've even heard them called smothered verbs. What you call them is not important. What is important is that you learn to recognize when you've got nouns that could be verbs and train yourself to return them to their preferred state.

(Wayne Schiess, When verbs become nouns (May 9, 2008) www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/wschiess/legalwriting/.)  Wayne then provides examples of nominalizations in common legal use:

For example, this sentence contains two nouns that wanted to be verbs:

  • My expectation was that counsel would make an objection.

If we return these nouns to their verb forms, the sentence improves:

  • I expected counsel to object.

(Ibid.)  The best part of the article is the list of common nominalizations.  Take a look at the list and check off all the ones that you think you've used in your own writing.  It's painful to see how predictable we are as writers.

Read More

CAOC and CAALA present Class Action Seminar: Secrets From the Bench and Bar

On May 21, 2008, at the CAALA Offices, 800 W. 6th Street, Suite 700, Los Angeles, California, Consumer Attorneys of California (CAOC) Class Action Section and Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles (CAALA) will present a seminar entitled "Class Action Seminar: Secrets from the Bench and Bar."  The program should have a lot to offer:

Welcome and Introduction
Co-Moderator: Paul R. Kiesel Kiesel, Boucher & Larson, LLP, Beverly Hills
Co-Moderator: Brian S. Kabateck Kabateck Brown Kellner, LLP, Los Angeles

How To Make An Impact From A Research Attorney's Perspective
Jason E. Barsanti (State) Arias, Ozzello & Gignac, LLP, Los Angeles
Kevin McReynolds (Federal) U.S. District Court, Central District

Want Your Settlement Approved? Hon. Carolyn B. Kuhl (State) Los Angeles Superior Court, Central Civil West
Hon. George P. Schiavelli (Federal) U.S. District Court, Central District

How To Manage Your Class Action
Jeff S. Westerman Milberg LLP, Los Angeles

Winning Writs
David M. Arbogast Arbogast & Berns LLP, Los Angeles

Winning Appeals
Gretchen M. Nelson Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP, Los Angeles

Access To Justice – Class Action Preservation Project
Gerson H. Smoger President-Elect, Public Justice

(See, CAOC Seminar Information page.)  The only part of this seminar that I don't get is where they came up with that Barsanti fellow.  Who is this guy?  Oh, yes, he's in that office next to mine.  I remember now.  Seriously, congratulations to Mr. Barsanti.

Read More

When legislators decide to "fix" things, the remedy is often worse than the ailment

Paul KarlsgodtClassActionBlawg.com has a short post, entitled "Congressmen seek investigation on practices of class action lawyers: A good use of taxpayer dollars," that says a lot.  Referring to a CFO.com news story, ClassActionBlawg.com offers a modest proposal to the legislators that want to put the entire class action system under the microscope, all on account of recent media coverage of a few bad apples (Lerach, et al.).  (See, Plourd, On the Hill, Trying to Put Plaintiffs' Bar on the Defensive (May 6, 2008) www.cfo.com.)

The post on ClassActionBlawg.com is short, so I repeat the core of it here:

Certainly, there have been some high-profile abuses among members of the plaintiffs’ class action bar recently. But these are examples of individual arrogance and greed, not evidence of an epidemic in need of a Congressional investigation–especially in light of the myriad other things Congress could be doing these days. The acts of a few bad apples shouldn’t ruin the bunch.

Among other things, Boehner and Smith seek “[r]eforms that Congress can make to rid the judicial system of [class action] abuses.” If you really want to spend government money to prevent class action abuse, here’ s a modest proposal from a class action defense lawyer’s perspective: try better funding for the courts. If there were more, better-paid judges available to give the time and thoughtful analysis needed in carrying out their function as gatekeepers rather than simply doing whatever they can to manage their overflowing dockets, maybe there wouldn’t be any incentive to pursue frivolous class actions and abusive tactics. Just an idea.

It is worth emphasizing that Paul Karlsgodt practices primarily on the defense side of class actions.  The class action device isn't "broken" because of few bad actors.  Every profession has them.  Let's entrust our court system to talented jurists that are appropriately compensated.  Let's give them the resources they need to do their job in an orderly manner, and let's give them facilities that aren't crumbling and overcrowded.  The Complex Litigator seconds ClassActionBlawg.com's proposal.

[Via ClassActionBlawg.com]

Read More

Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering decides interesting fee dispute over court reporting charges

Greatsealcal100Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering (May 7, 2008), arising from a fee dispute between the plaintiffs and a court reporting agency, is an interesting decision that may ultimately affect complex cases with far greater frequency than simple cases like Serrano.  In Serrano, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) reviewed a ruling by the trial court that required plaintiffs to pay the full amount charged by a court reporting agency to receive their certified copies of various transcripts:

The defendant noticed the depositions of several of the Serranos’ expert witnesses, including Robert Audell. The Audell deposition took place on June 26, 2006, and was reported by a certified shorthand reporter employed by Coast. Counsel for the Serranos requested a certified copy of the transcript. The trial was scheduled to begin on July 25, 2006.

(Slip op., at p. 4.)  Despite the fact that the defendant requested the expedited transcripts, the court reporting agency also charged the plaintiffs an "expedite" fee on top of the cost of the certified copies.  (Ibid.) "The Serranos filed an ex parte application on July 5, 2006, for an order requiring Coast to provide a copy of the Audell deposition transcript without charging any expedited service fee." (Slip. op., at p. 5.)

At this point, things get exciting.  The court reporting agency provided the transcripts on the condition that the plaintiffs agree to be bound by the trial court's ruling on the charges.  At the ex parte hearing, the trial court expressed sympathy with the plaintiffs, but denied them relief:

“I would love to give you relief. I don’t think I can. So take it up. Maybe, you know, one of the divisions up there will feel sympathetic.”

(Slip op., at p. 6.) The Serranos then petitioned the Court of Appeal for an extraordinary writ on August 25, 2006. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition on September 20, 2006 (parenthetical note: the denial of a petition for a writ is many times not an opinion on the merits of the issue raised).  The parties settled, but the trial court carved out the issue of the transcript fees on appeal.  Then, the Court of Appeal considered the merits, the court reporting agency appearing as objector and respondent.  After dispensing with various standing and jurisdictional arguments, the Court didn't mince words when examining the core contention:

Coast argues that a court ordering a deposition reporter to provide a copy of a transcript to a party pursuant to section 2025.510, subdivision (c) must order that party to pay the fee charged by the deposition reporter regardless of the amount of the fee. We firmly reject that argument. As we now explain, if a deposition reporter either refuses to provide a copy of a deposition transcript to a non-noticing party in a pending action, for whatever reason, or imposes unacceptable conditions upon such delivery, and the court must intervene, we conclude that the “expense” that the court may require the non noticing party to pay for the transcript must be reasonable.

(Slip op., at pp. 27-28.)  Continuing to pound in the point, the Court said:

Depositions play an important role in litigation and trial preparation, and deposition testimony may be offered as evidence in pretrial proceedings and, in some circumstances, at trial. In light of the importance of deposition testimony in a pending action and the non-noticing party’s lack of bargaining power, a trial court must be cautious not to lend assistance to overreaching by the deposition reporter. For a deposition reporter to refuse to provide a copy of a transcript to a non-noticing party in a pending action unless the party agrees to pay an unreasonable fee would be grossly unfair. Moreover, for a deposition reporter, as an officer of the court, to engage in such conduct would be an abuse of the reporter’s authority. For a trial court to condone such conduct by conditioning the party’s right to receive a copy of a transcript on payment of an unreasonable fee would undermine rather than promote the administration of justice and could very well result in a denial of due process to the non-noticing party victimized by the reporter’s conduct. It therefore follows that the only monetary condition that the court may properly place upon the non noticing party’s right to receive a copy of the deposition transcript would be payment of a reasonable fee.

(Slip op., at pp. 28-29.)  The Court of Appeal concluded by expressly holding that "[t]he cost of transcription must be borne by the party noticing the deposition, unless the court on motion and for good cause orders otherwise (§ 2025.510, subd. (b)), so a reasonable fee for a copy of the transcript would not include any amount that compensates the deposition reporter for the cost to expedite the transcription."  (Slip op. at p. 31.)

So out of a simple personal injury case that settled, we now know that court reporters cannot charge non-noticing parties an expedited transcript fee if it was the noticing party that requested the expedited transcript.  Court reporters around the state must be calling the respondent to thank them for clearing up this point of law.  Complex, multi-party cases may see a significant bottom-line cost savings, although I do not profess to know whether there is an industry practice by court reporters to charge non-noticing parties an expedited transcript fee when it was the noticing party that initially requested the expedited processing.

Read More

(Just Slightly) OFF TOPIC: Neo blames paparazzo for damaging Neo's car with body. Mr. Smith laughs evilly.

I am very sorry, but I am constitutionally incapable of remaining serious for the life of this blog.  Thus, when I read on California Punitive Damages that Keanu Reeves lost a motion to strike punitive damage claims brought by a photographer that acccused Mr. Reeves of intentionally running into him, I saw a fat one in my wheelhouse.  Imagine the hearing...

NEO:  Your Honor Dude, I move to strike that paparazzo's outrageous punitive damage claims.

MR. SMITH:  Mr. ... Anderson.  We have your file.  We know how much force you applied to the accelerator.  We know you backed up to look for tread marks.  You struck the photograher.  Your motion to strike is denied Mr. Anderson.  And you know what they say; two strikes do make an intentional tort.  [Laughs evilly.]

NEO:  Who are you?  I want my lawyer.

MR. SMITH:  And how will you speak to your lawyer...when you don't have a mouth.  [Laughs even more evilly as NEO claws at his now mouthless face in horror.]

If you didn't watch the Matrix films (i.e., if you are older than me or lack the nerd/geek gene) this will all be meaningless to you.  It was really, really funny to me.  For an ever so slightly less fanciful version of this story, head over to California Punitive Damages.  If you have no idea what I am talking about, but are curious enough to do some research, take a look at Wikipedia's page on the Matrix.

[Via, oddly enough, California Punitive Damages.]

Read More

Apologies to the blogroll members

Due to a configuration error, a number of highly commendable blogs were not appearing on The Complex Litigator's "Blogs of Note" blogroll, despite having been entered on the administrator's site.  That has been corrected.  The Complex Litigator invites all readers to explore what these "Blogs of Note" have to offer, as some of the early entries were pushed off the list for the past several weeks.

Read More